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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Contrary to first appearance therefore, this opinion cannot be taken
as case authority for what would be the very unorthodox position of
no acceptance by conduct of the offeree. It merely indicates the refusal
of the appellate court, without an assignment of error," to upset the
trial court's assessment of the adequacy of the acceptance in the full
circumstances of the case. However, the record does present a quantum
of behaviour on the part of the acceptor which if not contemplated with
considerable caution might be a distracting parameter in future cases
involving the formation of contracts.
IvoR LUSTY
Advances to Commission Salesmen-Duty to Repay. Selig v. Bergman, 143 Wash.
Dec. 188, 260 P.2d 883 (1953), was an action to recover those advances made to the
defendant, plaintiff's salesman employee, which were in excess of commissions earned.
In accordance with the general rule, the court held that where advances made to a
salesman are charged against his commissions, he is not required to repay any excess
of advances over commissions earned, unless it has been expressly or impliedly agreed
that he do so.
CREDITOR'S RIGHTS
Declaration of Homestead-Effect on Existing Judgment Lien. In
Locke v. Collins,' the court stated that when a judgment lien has
attached to the judgment debtor's property,2 and the debtor later de-
clares a homestead exemption,' the lien while unenforceable under the
general execution statutes, is not extinguished but is rather superseded
and suspended. Therefore it was held that such a lien on the judgment
debtor's property survived his subsequent discharge in bankruptcy,
although the underlying debt was extinguished by the discharge.
While previous cases had been uniform in holding that the declara-
tion of a homestead exemption rendered outstanding judgment liens
unenforceable,4 the question of whether the lien was completely ex-
tinguished or merely suspended during the life of the homestead
exemption, was heretofore undetermined. The present holding would
appear to indicate that the lien would be revived if the homestead were
abandoned, and could thereafter be enforced by the judgment creditor.
Viewing the reverse situation where the judgment comes after the
10 Rule on appeal 43, 34A Wn.2d. 47.
'42 Wn.2d 532, 256 P.2d 832 (1953).
2 RCW 4.56.190; RCW 4.56.200.
3 RCW 6.12.010; RCW 6.12.040.
4 Brown v. Manos, 140 Wash. 525, 250 Pac. 36 (1926) ; Kenyon v. Erskine, 69 Wash.
110, 124 Pac. 392 (1912) ; Snelling v. Butler, 66 Wash. 165, 119 Pac. 3 (1911).
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homestead is declared, the cases without exception have held that no
judgment lien can attach to the property.5
MYRON J. CARLSON
Mortgage Acceleration Clause. Courts are divided as to the degree
of rigor with which acceleration clauses operate upon default of the
mortgagor in an element of his performance. Under what circumstances
will a court of equity suspend the operation of the clause?
The basic rule is that if default be shown in. any degree, and if no
waiver has been established by the conduct of the mortgagee, the pro-
visions will be enforced. It is upon the circumstances justifying relief
from the harshness of this basic rule that the courts are divided. In
the "strict" jurisdictions relief will only be given when the mortgagee,
by fraud or otherwise, hinders the mortgagor's performance, while in
the more "liberal" jurisdiction relief will be given if payment becomes
delinquent by reason of the debtor's mistake in good faith and where
hardship would result from precipitant foreclosure.
In the annotation at 70 A.L.R. 993 (1930), the writer has designated
Washington as belonging to the former group based upori the decision
of the court in Tibbetts v. Bush and Lane Piano Co.6 In that case relief
was given to a good-faith debtor who failed to make timely payments
to an evasive creditor. Such a result, it is submitted, is not sufficient
to support the annotator's position, for a "liberal" jurisdiction also
would have granted relief in those circumstances. However his pre-
sentient classification has now been vindicated by the recent case of
Jacobson v. McClanahan" in which relief was denied to a good-faith
debtor who failed to make timely payments to a willing creditor.
It is now safe to say, therefore, that Washington adheres to the
majority or "strict" rule that, to quote from the Johnson opinion, relief
can be expected only "when default is attributable to the unconscion-
able or inequitable conduct of the mortgagee."
IvoR LUSTY
Garnishment-G-arnishee Liable For Double Payment. In Portland Association of
Credit Men, Inc. v. Early, 42 Wn.2d 273, 254 P2d 758 (1953), the court pointed out
that unless the garnishee who pays the amount of his indebtedness into court does so
s In re Shelton, 102 F. Supp. 629 (1952) ; Lyon v. Herboth, 133 Wash. 15, 233 Pac.
24 (1925) ; Security National Bank v. Mason, 117 Wash. 95, 200 Pac. 1097 (1921);
Meikle v. Cloquet, 44 Wash. 513, 87 Pac. 841 (1906); Trader's National Bank v.
Schorr, 20 Wash. 1, 54 Pac. 543 (1898).
0 111 Wash. 165, 189 P. 996 (1920).
7 143 Wash. Dec. 692, 264 P.2d 253 (1953).
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under compulsion of judgment as provided by RCW 71.32.300, or after interpleading
conflicting claimants as provided by RCW 4.08.150, the garnishee may be later required
to pay a second time to a claimant of the debt who was not made a party to the gar-
nishment proceeding. "When a writ of garnishment is served upon a garnishee, it casts
upon him the responsibility of protecting his interests." He can do this only if he pays
under compulsion of judgment or interpleads conflicting claimants as provided by the
statutes.
CRIMINAL LAW
Equivocal Plea of Guilty. In State v. Rose1 the defendant, charged
with first degree assault, entered a plea of guilty, but when asked, some
minutes later, if he had anything to say on his behalf, replied, "I would
like to make it clear I didn't fire the pistol at anybody with intentions
to hit them." While noting that intent is an element of the crime
charged, the court held the plea was a bona fide plea of guilty. State v.
Stacy2 came up to the court later in the year. The defendant, also
charged with first degree assault, answered the court's question of plea,
saying, "I plead guilty to that charge .... I would like to make a state-
ment to that charge. Even though I am pleading guilty to that charge
it is a lie on my part. I am doing so on advice of counsel." He made
a similar statement a few moments later, adding that he was so pleading
"on the advice of my wife." The court held that the trial court erred
in accepting the plea without first eliminating the equivocation.
All guilty pleas should be considered against the background of
certain general principles. The plea entered by the defendant must be
guilty or not guilty or former jeopardy or acquittal.' The plea of
guilty should be entirely voluntary by one competent to know the
consequences and not induced by fear, apprehension, persuasion,
promises, inadvertance or ignorance.4 A plea of guilty admits all the
elements of the crime charged.5 One of the maxims resulting from an
amalgamation of these general principles is that the crucial test of a
trial court's action in accepting a plea of guilty is whether the defendant
entered his plea of guilty freely and understandingly, whether he readily
understood that he was admitting the commission of the acts consti-
142 Wn.2d 509, 256 P.2d 497 (1953).
-143 Wash. Dec. 331, 261 P.2d 400 (1953).
3 RCW 10.40.150
4 Ortigas v. State, 140 Fla. 671, 192 So. 795 (1940) ; Bennett v. State, 75 Okl. Cr.
42 (1942) ; Pennington v. Smith, 35 Wn.2d 267, 212 P.2d 811 (1949).
People v. Mendietta, 100 Cal. App.2d 763, 226 P.2d 812 (1951); Cummings v.
Perry, 194 Ga. 424, 21 S.E. 2d 847 (1942) ; Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wn.2d 155, 160 P.2d
529 (1945).
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